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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the association between acute stress and risk taking in 
financial decisions.  The study includes 40 (31 women, 9 men) 18-22 year old university 
students.  Half of the participants were assigned to a Socially-Evaluated Cold-Pressor task to 
elicit a physiological stress response, while the other half were assigned to the control (no stress) 
condition.  Individuals then completed two computer tasks (risk propensity and risk premium) 
that assessed risk taking in financial decisions, both in the gain and loss domain.  There was a 
significant increase in risk taking for participants exposed to an acute stressor in the loss domain 
and overall.  Additionally, there was a significant effect of financial domain (gain vs. loss) on 
risk propensity across stress/non-stress conditions.  Participants were more risk prone in the gain 
domain than in the loss domain.  Our data suggests that acute stress may play a role in the way 
people assess risk in decision making, specifically within the financial decisions.  This research 
will help us understand the interaction between stressful environments, and how individuals 
make risk related decisions under these conditions.   
Keywords: socially-evaluated cold-pressor task, cortisol, acute stress, decision making, 
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Effects of Acute Stress on Risk Taking in Financial Decisions 
 
 
Every day, humans are faced with innumerable decisions.  Individuals must weigh the 
alternatives, assess the risks, and select the option that will satisfy the interests of the intended 
beneficiary.  Humans make decisions based on a subjective interpretation of information, and 
consequently, individuals interpret a set of identical information differently (Savage, 1954).  The 
interpretation of information is influenced by motives, previous knowledge, feelings and a 
myriad of other cognitive, social and emotional influences (Redhead, 2009).  Among these 
factors, behavioral economists have been particularly interested in examining the effect of stress 
on financial decision making, but there are substantial inconsistencies in this work.  That is, 
stress has been linked to reduced (van Honk, Schutter, Hermans, & Putman, 2003) as well as 
increased (van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009) risk taking.  In light of these inconsistencies, 
this study aims to gain a more accurate assessment of risk taking by creating two paradigms that 
specifically test for risk taking based on economic theory.  Specifically, we examine the effect of 
acute stress on risk propensity through financial decision making tasks that determine risk in 
both financial gains and losses.  
Stress and Risk 
 Emotion plays a pivotal role in our appraisal of information, and can alter the way one 
perceives an event (Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1994).  The physiological response to a stressful 
event alters an individual’s formation of thought (Erickson, Drevets, & Schulkin, 2003).  Stress 
influences cognitive performance in an inverted U-shape, which means that the brain functions 
best at moderate levels of stress, and declines in both low and high states of stress (Conrad 
Lupien, & McEwen 1999).  As stress increases past optimal levels, cognitive resources are 
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reduced (Conrad et al., 1999), and consequently, individuals may begin to alter the way in which 
they come to assess risk in a given decision.  Some have found that an increase in stress leads to 
increased risk taking (van den Bos et al., 2009), while other studies have found a shift toward 
risk averse behavior (van Honk et al., 2003).  These inconsistencies may be due to the context in 
which risk is taken.  Specifically, how does domain (gain or loss) effect an individual’s 
assessment of a financial decision in the presence of stress?   
Assessing Risk Propensity  
Risk propensity can be assessed by exposing individuals to decisions with uncertain 
outcomes.  In finance, the principal model of decision making under uncertainty is Expected 
Utility Theory (Sullivan, 1993).  This theory states that individuals choose between risky 
prospects by multiplying the utility of each choice’s outcome by their respective probability (e.g. 
a 25% chance of winning $4 is calculated as .25($4) = $1) (Davis, Hands & Mäki, 1998).  One 
can determine an individual’s risk propensity by making someone decide between a certain value 
and a gamble, each with equal expected value (Menezes & Hanson, 1970).  An individual is 
defined as a risk aversive if he/she prefers the certain amount equal to the expected value of the 
gamble (Menezes & Hanson, 1970).  For example, if given the choice between a 25% chance of 
winning $4 versus a certain gain of $1, the individual who selects taking the dollar preferred the 
certain win, even though the value of each option is equal over the long run.  
Risk propensity can be further examined by looking at an individual’s risk premium.  
Risk premium is defined as the amount of money an individual is willing to pay to guarantee a 
sure gain or prevent a sure loss in relation to the risky choice (Menezes & Hanson, 1970).  
Determining the certainty equivalent, the amount of money needed to make an individual 
indifferent between the risk and a certain value, can assess an individual’s risk premium 
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(Menezes & Hanson, 1970).  For example, present an individual with a 25% chance of winning 
$4, and ask them to indicate the value of a certain gain that would make them indifferent 
between the two choices.  If someone responds ‘$0.75,’ then his/her risk premium is $0.25 
because the expected value of that gamble ($1) subtracted by the individual’s certainty 
equivalent value ($0.75) is the amount of money that person is willing to pay to obtain the sure 
gain.   
Gain/Loss Domain within Risk 
Economists have researched tenets within Expected Utility and have uncovered a number 
of violations within the theory.  Kahneman & Tversky (1979) developed Prospect Theory as a 
supplement to Expected Utility Theory.  Prospect Theory aims to illuminate the observed 
departure from the tenants posed in Expected Utility.  Their work found that individuals tend to 
dislike losses more than gains, a phenomenon known as loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  For example, people rarely accept a gamble with a 50-50 chance of winning or losing 
$100.  Under the axioms of expected utility, an individual would be indifferent to this gamble 
because the expected value of the gamble is $0, but people are more afraid to lose $100 
compared to gaining the same amount.  Kahneman & Tversky (1979) also observed a 
phenomenon called reflection effect, whereby changing the domain (i.e. from gain to loss) often 
reverses a person’s risk taking tendencies.  Subjects are generally risk averse in the gain domain, 
and risk prone in the loss domain.  For example, individuals will usually select a sure gain (win 
$2) when the alternative is a possible gain (50% chance of winning $4), thus risk averse.  
However, when the domain is reversed (lose $2 versus 50% chance of losing $4), individuals 
prefer to select the gamble and thus are risk prone.  This study will therefore test the effects of 
acute stress on risk aversion in both the gain and loss domains. 
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Specific Aims 
This study aims to expand our understanding of stress induced decision making by 
creating two decision tasks that specifically look at risk taking in both the gain and loss domain.  
By looking at risk behavior within a gain or loss, we can gain a more insightful understanding of 
how people make real-life financial decisions.  Subjects in the study will undergo a procedure 
that elicits a cortisol response followed by a decision task that measures risk propensity and a 
task that measures risk premium.  Thereby examining how an acute stress may influence the 
rationality displayed in financial decisions.  
First, we hypothesize that individuals in the acute stress condition will display an altered 
subjective appraisal of financial decisions, resulting in increased loss aversion.  We further predict 
that this effect will be moderated by the gain/loss domain condition.  Specifically, the increased 
loss aversion will result in in more risk taking in the loss domain in comparison to the gain 
domain, in an attempt to mitigate immediate and certain financial losses.  In addition, we predict 
that individuals in the acute stress condition will show an overall decreased risk premium, 
indicative of risk taking behavior.  Finally, we predict that risk premium will be moderated by 
gain/loss domain. Specifically, we expect to see an exaggerated effect of decreased risk premium 
in the loss domain.  This research will help us understand the interaction between stressful 
environments, and how individuals make risk related decisions under these conditions.   
Method 
Participants 
 All participants were undergraduate students from the University of Michigan (31 
women, 9 men, Mage = 18.7 years, range 18-22 years) who were recruited through the 
Psychology Department Human Subjects Pool as part of the research participation requirement 
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for Introductory Psychology. After completion of the study, subjects were compensated with 1.5 
hours of credit towards their research participation requirement.  
Procedure  
 
Experiments were conducted between 13:00 and 18:00 to ensure consistent cortisol 
collection between subjects.  All subjects signed an informed consent indicating they were 
participating in the experiment out of free will and were free at all times to quit the experiment. 
Upon entering the experimental room, subjects were told to sit and relax for 30 minutes to 
accommodate any potential stress of participating in an experiment or entering a psychology 
laboratory.  After the baseline period, the first saliva sample was taken.  Subsequently, 
participants were split randomly into two conditions.  One half of participants completed the 
experimental condition, called the Socially-Evaluated Pressor task, while the others sat for an 
additional 5 minutes.  All participants then completed, in counterbalanced order, the two 
financial decision tasks lasting approximately 20 minutes.  After completion of the decision 
tasks, participants returned to the waiting room for approximately 25 minutes and subsequent 
cortisol saliva samples were taken 25 and 45 minutes after the initial sample.  All subjects were 
debriefed with appropriate materials concerning the aims of the study and given the opportunity 
to address any questions or concerns.  
Socially-Evaluated Cold-Pressor Task  
To induce stress, half of the participants underwent a Socially-Evaluated Cold-Pressor 
task, which has been previously validated to elicit an acute cortisol response (Schwabe, Haddad, 
& Schachinger, 2008).  Participants were asked to place their hand in a bucket filled with a 
mixture of clean tap water and ice (approximately 4 °C) for as long as possible or until they 
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experienced significant discomfort.  If their hand was still submerged after two minutes, they 
were asked to remove their hand. 
Financial Decision Making Task 
Risk Propensity Task.  Participants completed two E-Prime computer tasks, adapted 
from Kahneman and Tversky (1979), to assess individual risk-taking.  The first task, risk 
propensity task, consisted of 64 trials in which participants viewed and selected between a 
gamble (a monetary value with a percentage chance of win/loss) and a certain value, each with 
equal expected value (see Figure 1).  The 64 trials within this condition were split evenly 
between the gain and loss domain (32 trials each).  Each trial was displayed for five seconds, or 
the time it took the individual to make a decision, followed by a half second fixation period.  
Participants who selected the guaranteed outcome for loss/gain trials are defined as risk aversive, 
whereas individuals who selected the gamble option are defined as risk prone.  The overall 
proportion of risky choices selected in the task measured risk propensity.   
Risk Premium Task.  In the second task, adapted from Pratt (1964), participants were 
shown a gamble and asked to selected a value that would make the individual indifferent 
between the two options (see Figure 2).  Each trial was displayed for ten seconds, or the time it 
took the individual to make a decision, followed by a half second fixation period.  As in the first 
condition, the 64 trials were split between gain and loss domain (32 trials each).  Individuals 
were given a gamble, and asked to state the outright value such that he/she was indifferent 
between that gift and the opportunity to play the gamble.  An individual’s risk premium was 
measured by the mean risk premium (expected value minus certainty equivalent). Trials in both 
tasks were randomized, and options distributed equally on the left and right hemifield.  
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Analytic Approach 
The direct and interactive effects of stress and domain (gain vs. loss) on our outcomes 
(risk propensity or risk premium) were examined using a General Linear Model.  Specifically, 
we predicted risk propensity from stress as a between-subject effect, and domain as a within 
subject effect, and the interaction between stress and domain.  A similar model was conducted to 






Risk Propensity.  The financial domain (gain vs. loss) had a significant effect on risk 
propensity across stress/non-stress conditions t(39) = 2.92, p < .01 (see Figure 3).  Participants 
selected the risky option more often for gains (M = .55) compared to losses (M = .38).  There 
was no observed difference between males and females in the risk propensity test in the gain 
domain t(38) = 0.64, p = .529, loss domain t(38) = 0.75, p = .457 or overall risk t(38) = 0.14, p 
= .891 (see Figure 4).  There was no significant difference between stress and control conditions 
for risk propensity in the gain domain t(38) = 1.02, p = .315, but the difference in the loss 
domain approached significance t(38) = 1.81, p = .078, and there was an observed difference in 
overall risk propensity t(38) = 2.76, p < .01.  Individuals in the acute stress condition displayed 
an increase in risk taking in the loss domain (M = .44) and overall (M = .51) compared to the 
control group in loss domain (M = .31) and overall (M = .41) (see Figure 5, see Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics).   
Risk Premium.  Number of respondents in this task (N = 39) was reduced due to a 
corrupted file.  There were no significant differences in risk premium between the gain and loss 
domain across stress/non-stress conditions t(38) = 1.36, p = .183 (see Figure 6).  There were no 
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observed difference between males and females in the risk premium test for the gain domain t(37) 
= 0.75, p = .457, loss domain t(37) = 0.70, p = .488 or overall t(37) = 0.81, p = .421  (see Figure 
7).  There was no significant difference between stress and control condition for risk premium in 
the gain t(37) = 1.43, p = .162, loss domain t(37) = 1.15, p = .256 or overall t(37) = 1.41, p 
= .168 (see Figure 8, see Table 1 for descriptive findings). 
Multivariate Analysis  
 Effects of stress on Risk Propensity.  A general linear model was used to test the effect 
of acute stress and domain (gain vs. loss) on the proportion of risky decisions.  There was a 
significant effect of domain on risk propensity, F(1, 38) = 8.34, p < .01, !2 = .18.  Participants 
selected risky options more often in the gain condition (M = .55) than in the loss domain (M 
= .38).  The effect of stress on risk propensity was also significant, F(1 ,38) = 7.62, p < .01, !2 
= .167.  Specifically, participants in the stress condition were more risk prone (M = .51) 
compared to participants in the non-stress condition (M = .42).  Finally, the interaction between 
stress and domain was not significant, F(1, 38) = 0.27, p = .61, !2 = .007 (see Table 2 for 
multivariate findings). 
 Effects of stress on Risk Premium.  A general linear model was used to test the effect of 
the acute stress and domain (gain vs. loss) on risk premium.  The financial domain did not affect 
an individuals’ risk premium, F(1, 37) = 1.87, p = .179, !2 = .048.  Acute stress also had no 
effect on risk premium, F(1, 37) = 1.98, p = .168, !2 = .051.  Finally, the interaction between 
stress and domain was not significant F(1, 37) = 0.55, p = .461, !2 = .015 (see Table 2 for 
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Discussion  
 
In this study, we examined a possible relationship between stress, domain, and their 
effects on risk propensity.   The results from the risk propensity task are relatively consistent 
with the proposed hypothesis.  Although not all of the data held statistical significance, there was 
an observed trend towards increased risk taking under the cold-pressor condition, especially in 
overall and loss domain risk propensity.  Conversely, the data from the risk premium task did not 
support the proposed hypothesis.  Participants in the stress condition increased the amount of 
money they would be willing to sacrifice in order to receive the certain value, but few inferences 
can be derived from these findings because none of the risk premium data held statistical 
significance.  This is the first study to create two distinct risk propensity tasks to examine the 
effect of acute stress on financial domain in decision making.   
Regarding risk propensity, we found a main effect of gain/loss domain.  Specifically, we 
found that participants across stress/non-stress conditions were more risk prone in the gain 
domain, compared to the loss domain.  These findings are inconsistent with reflection effect in 
Prospect Theory, which posits that risk taking is increased in the loss domain (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  However, the findings from their study were obtained from across-subject 
testing, as opposed to within-subject (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980).  Therefore, it is possible 
that their findings reflect differences between the groups assigned to the conditions as opposed to 
differences in the effect of their domain.  Our protocol examined risk propensity in the gain and 
loss condition within subjects in random order, increasing the likelihood that our findings truly 
reflect differences in the effect of the financial domain.   
In addition, we found a main effect of stress on risk propensity.  Specifically, we found 
that in the risk propensity task, participants in the acute stress condition were more risk prone in 
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the loss domain (approaching significance) and overall (all trials including gain and loss 
domain).  The outcome from the risk propensity task is consistent with findings made by van den 
Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop (2009).  We propose that the observed increase in risk taking is due in 
part to the physiological effects of stress, which alter an individual’s subjective perception of risk 
(Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1994).   In order to learn more about stress in decision making, one 
must understand the physiology behind the stress.   
Cortisol is a glucocorticoid hormone secreted by the adrenal gland in response to 
activation in the hippocampus.  Once released into the bloodstream, cortisol elicits a wide range 
of physiological, behavioral and cognitive effects including changes in appetite, emotional and 
social behaviors like attachment, temperament and mood (Erickson et al., 2003).  Elevated 
cortisol levels result in increased subjective arousal in humans (Erickson et al., 2003), and have 
been shown to increases attention toward negative emotional stimuli (Suslow, Arolt, & 
Junghanns, 2000).  Furthermore, neuroeconomic research has speculated that cortisol may 
significantly influence financial decision making through its interaction with the nucleus 
accumbens, which plays a central role in the mesolimbic dopaminergic system (Coates, Gurnell, 
& Sarnyai, 2010).  Acutely elevated levels of cortisol increase extracellular dopamine levels, 
associated with euphoria and reward-like properties related to sensation-seeking behavior (Cabib 
& Puglisi-Allegra, 1996).  This physiological arousal may influence the way individuals assess 
risk in a financial decision making task.  Specifically, the increase in cortisol and its subsequent 
effects may lead to increased risk taking.  
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find an interaction between gain/loss domain 
and stress in predicting risk propensity.  Our multivariate interaction analysis of domain and 
stress condition resulted in no significant findings in the risk propensity task or the risk premium 
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task.  The absence of an interaction suggests an analogous relationship between stress and 
financial domain.  Our findings are inconsistent with Porcelli & Delgando (2009), which found 
that acute stress exaggerates the reflection effect by increasing risk propensity in the loss domain 
and decreasing risk propensity in the gain domain.  As mentioned previously, our results may 
have been due to the physiological arousal from increased cortisol, causing a unidirectional 
preference for risk.  
Limitations  
 The first limitation to this study is the small sample size (N = 40).  Although there were 
some interesting trends observed from both financial decision tasks, it was difficult to achieve 
statistical significance with such a small pool of participants.  The small sample size and 
disproportionate number of females also led to a lack of external validity.  The disproportionate 
gender ratio is likely due to the proportion of females enrolled in Introductory Psychology, from 
which subjects were recruited.  The population is also likely misrepresentative because all 
subjects were undergraduate students in an Introductory Psychology course, which limits the 
variety of age, intelligence, racial and socioeconomic status of participants.   
The results from the risk premium task indicate that there might have been some 
limitations in the construct validity of the test.  According to Pratt (1964), individuals are 
expected to respond with a certainty equivalent value that is less than the expected value of the 
alternative option.  The results show that on average, individuals entered a certainty equivalent 
greater than the expected value.  In the task, the instructions stated to determine a value for the 
certain win or loss that would make an individual ‘indifferent’ with the gamble presented.  In the 
study, many participants asked for clarification, and some did not seem to understand the concept 
of indifference.  Possible misunderstanding of the task led to large variability in responses. Some 
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participants understood the implications of selecting an actual value, while others entered 
seemingly illogical responses.  Future studies could possibly improve on this task by rejecting 
responses with a value greater than the expected value within each trial.  Additionally, many of 
the responses lacked specificity.  For example, many participants rounded their responses by 
entering values like ‘$1.00’ or ‘$2.00,’ which can affect the accuracy of a test when expected 
values of a the trials were rarely a rounded financial value.  
 Furthermore, there are many factors that contribute to an individual’s risk propensity, so 
it is difficult to determine what actually caused the observed change in risk taking between 
individuals in the stress condition compared to the control.  One way future studies might 
mitigate this discrepancy would be to change the study to a repeated measures design in which 
individuals complete the risk propensity and premium tasks under the control and acute stress 
condition.  This way, the differences between the stress and control may provide a better 
understanding of how stress individually affects risk propensity.   
Another limitation of the study is the effectiveness of the cold-pressor intervention.  Due 
to necessary ethical concerns, stress induction must be minimally invasive.  This study defined 
acute stress as an individual exposed to a Socially-Evaluated Cold-Pressor task.  Outside the 
laboratory, individuals in stressful situations perceive their stress as emotional, while this study 
looks solely at physiological arousal resulting from stress induction in a controlled laboratory 
setting.  Participants in the stress condition were oftentimes unaware of their stress, which makes 
it difficult to determine if the experiment is testing the impact of stress in the real world, or 
exposure to elevated cortisol.   
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Summary and Implications 
Overall, we found that both domain and acute stress affect risk propensity in financial 
decision making.  Although there are some inconsistencies, data from the risk propensity task 
showed that individuals under acute stress display increased risk taking compared to individuals 
in the control.  The results from this study have some important implications on decision making 
for individuals in careers that involve risk assessment.  Coates & Herbert (2008) studied 
financial traders to examine the effects of endogenous steroids like cortisol and testosterone 
under real working conditions.  Their work found that cortisol increases in response to variance 
of trading results, and volatility of the market (Coates & Herbert, 2008).  Consequently, an 
increase in cortisol may shift an individual’s risk preferences and ability to form rational 
decisions.  If certain conditions within financial trading elicit an acute stress response, financial 
traders may be prone to selecting the more risk seeking choice, which may result in detrimental 
outcomes over the long run.   
Although this study specifically looks at acute stress, it is also important to consider the 
effects of prolonged exposure to stress on risk taking in the financial domain.  While acute 
exposure to stress can result in increased motivation and focus (Erickson et al., 2003), chronic 
exposure to stress hormones can affect neurological pathways through the stimulation of the 
stimulate corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRH) gene (Korte, 2001). This gene activation 
results in anxiety and can produce irrational pessimism by finding threat and risk where none 
exist (McEwen, 1998).   
There are many factors that contribute to risk assessment, and subsequent financial 
decisions, but examining the effect of stress is fundamental in understanding how emotions 
regulate our ability to make rational decisions.  Future research must focus on how this stress is 
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actually manifested in a person’s decision by looking at how stress affects the way we predict 
uncertain outcomes.  It is important to understand how stress alters the way we subjectively 
interpret risk within a financial decision, and what appraisal methods result in decisions that 
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Table 1 
 
























  Cold-Press (N = 20) Control (N = 20)  
 M SD M SD t p 
Gain .58 .13 .51 .26 1.01 .315 
Loss .44 .20 .32 .24 1.81 .078 
 Overall .51 .09 .42 .12 2.76 .009 
Risk Premium 
  Cold-Press (N = 20) Control (N = 19)  
 M SD M SD t p 
Gain -.37 .68 -.78 1.1 1.42 .162 
Loss -.31 .57 -.56 .81 1.15 .256 
 Overall -.34 .59 -.67 .86 1.40 .168 
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Figure 1 Illustration of two trials of the risk propensity task. In the first trial (top left), the 
participant must choose between a 40% chance of winning $2.00 and a certain winning of $0.80. 
In the second trial the participant must choose between a 25% chance of losing $4.00 and a certain 
loss of $1.00. Trials vary in percent chance of winning/losing, but all have equal expected value. 
Consequently, a risk prone choice is defined as selecting the option with uncertainty. Participants 
have 5 seconds to select between the two options followed by a half second fixation period.  























































Figure 2 Illustration of two trials of the risk premium task. In the first trial (top left), the 
participant must enter a value for a certain gain that makes him/her indifferent between a 40% 
chance of winning $2.00 and the value that they select. In the second trial, the participant must 
enter a value for a certain loss that makes him/her indifferent between a 25% chance of losing 
$4.00 and the value they select. Trials vary in percent chance of winning/losing. Participants 
have 5 seconds to select between the two options followed by a half second fixation period. 
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